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1 Introd uc tion
T he shape ofthe d istributionofw ealth isa topic that hasexerted a longfasci-
nation.T he empiric alregularitiesac rossd i®erent typesofec onomieshave often
b eenremarked upon,and the literature containsseveraltypesofd ynamic mod el
that canb e used ,inpart,to explainthe charac teristic shape ofthe d istribution.1
O nthe strength ofthisresearch some have gone so far asto suggest \law sof
d istribution"w hich societiesmust inexorably ob ey.B y contrast thispaper has
a mod est ob jec tive: it examinesthe e®ec t onw ealth d istributionofanaspec t of
inheritance proc essesthat hasrec eived relatively little attention.U singa sim-
ple framew ork that isc onsistent w ith stand ard mod elsofsavingsand b equest
b ehaviour it show sthe w ay inw hich the equilib rium d istributioncanb e d eter-
mined over a spec i¯ ed w ealth range.It also examinesthe relationship b etw een
equilib rium w ealth inequality and the d istributionoffamiliesby size w ithina
b road classofmod elsofthe b equest process.
T he principalresult isthat,und er fairlyw eakcond itions,partsofthe equilib -
rium d istributionofw ealth must b e charac terised bya narrow classoffunctional
forms.T he partsofthe d istributionw hich c anb e c aptured inthisw ay are d e-
limited by regionsinw hich spec i¯ c b ehaviouralcharac teristicsofw ealth-ow ners
are assumed to hold .T he c ond itionsthat are required for the mainresultsare
c onsistent w ith a numb er ofmod elsofw ealth ac cumulationand b equests.T he
1 SeeforexampleChampernowne(1 953,1 973),EichhornandG leissner(1 985),L ydall(1 968),
M andelbrot(1 960 ),Sargan(1 957),Vaughan(1 988),W oldandW hittle(1 957).
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familyoffunctionalformsinclud esthe stand ard formulae that have b eend erived
asequilib rium d istributionsina varietyofspec i¯ c mod elsofthe w ealth ac cumu-
lationand d istribution,and that are oftenutilised for ad hoc purposessuch as
curve-¯ttingfor particular partsofempiricalw ealth d istributions.
T he approach that Iuse isto spec ify the c ond itionsfor equilib rium ina
w ealth mod eld rivenby inheritance.T he theory offunctionalequationsisthen
used to charac terise the classofw ealth d istributionsthat are d etermined by the
equilib rium cond itions.
Sec tion2 outlinesthe fund amentalsofthe mod el.Sec tion3provesthe main
result for a simpli¯ ed versionofthe mod el,and show show the equilib rium w ealth
d istributiond erived inthe mainresult c anb e related to the parametersofthe
system.T hensec tions4 and 5d emonstrate how the elementarymod elc aneasily
b e extend ed to a numb er ofmore interestingcases.
2 T he M od el
Consid er a populationthat ismad e up ofa sequence ofgenerations.Let time
b e d isc rete and ind exed byt= :::;0 ;1;2 ,...and assume that each generationis
uniquely assoc iated w ith one contiguouspair ofperiod s: those w ho are child ren
at time tb ec ome ad ultsat time t+ 1.Assume that at anytime the population
consistsofa numb er offamilieseach ofw hich hasa d eterminate,¯nite numb er of
2
child ren,and that there areno child lessfamilies:2 apart from thisthe d istribution
offamiliesinthe populationisarb itrary.Let the proportionoffamiliesw ith k




pk = 1; (1)
and for populationstationarityp must satisfy:
KX
k= 1
kpk = 2 : (2 )
Inanin¯nite populationthisassumptioncanb e relaxed .
Imagine the ec onomy at any moment t: w e canconceive ofthe population
asb eingcomposed offamiliescharac terised by their joint w ealth leveland the
numb er ofchild renw ho w illeventuallyinherit that w ealth.T he w ealth d istribu-
tionofsuch familiesd epend suponthe spec i¯ c assumptionsmad e ab out the w ay
that w ealth grow sineach period ,people'ssavingsb ehaviour,the form ofw ealth
taxation,the w ay inw hich new familiesare formed ineach generation,and the
w ayinw hich parentsd istribute their w ealth.Ishallassume the follow ing:
Axiom 1 B equeathable w ealthgrowseverywhere byanexogenousfac tor ¯ d uring
one generation.
2Contrastthis with, forexample, themodelofW old and W hittle (1 957)and Eichhorn
andG leissner(1 985),inwhichthewealthofeachvanishinghouseholdisdistributedamongn
bene¯ ciaries,wheren is simplytheaveragenumberofinheritors intheeconomy¶.
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For example, ifthere isanexogenousrate ofgrow th oftotalw ealth g, a
uniform average propensity to c onsume out ofw ealth3c,and a taxonb equests
¿,then
¯ = [1 + g][1¡c][1¡¿]: (3)
Axiom 2 Allparentswhose ind ivid ualwealthsatis¯ esW 2 I ,where I isa proper
intervalthat d oesnot containzero,4 follow a policyofequald ivisionamongst their
kkid s.5
It isconvenient to summarise the parameterscharac terisinganyspec i¯ c im-
plementationofthese assumptionsthus:
¼ := (¯ ;p) (4 )
Let the w ealth d istributioninany generationtb e d enoted by a d istribution
functionFt:<7! [0 ;1]. B ec ause the d istributionw illb e cond itionaluponthe
particular value ofthe set ofparametersw e shallw rite it asFt(W ;¼). For a
given¼ equilib rium isd e¯ned asa situationw here,for anytand for allW 2 I :
Ft+ 1(W ;¼) = Ft(W ;¼) = F(W ;¼): (5)
3T his behaviouris consistentwithutilitymaximisationwherepreferences arehomothetic;
see,forexample,B eckerandTomes(1 979).
4T hatis,Imaybeaclosedinterval,[W 0 ;W 1],oranopen interval,ormaybeunbounded
above.
5T hisbehaviourwouldbetheconsequenceofutilitymaximisationunderhomotheticprefer-




Axiom 3 F iscontinuousover I.
T he fund amentalproblem isto ¯nd the familyoffunctionsF(W ;¼)giventhe
set ofparameters¼.Inprinciple a d istributionfunctionofw ealth ought to b e
d e¯ned onthe w hole realline - people c anhave negative asw ellaspositive net
w orth - but it w ould b e a d emand ingand perhapsunilluminatingtaskto try to
spec ify every d etailofthe d istributionfunctionover itsentire range.How ever,
for theoretic aland empiric alreasons,it isofteneconomicallyinterestingto focus
oncertainpartsofthe d istribution,for example the upper tail.So,w hat w e w ill
d o ischarac terise the shape ofthe functionF over the restric ted d omainI.
3 Assortative M ating
Asa ¯rst step c onsid e the c ase ofpositive assortative mating.T hisisa situation
ofstric t \classmarriage": a personat tw ith w ealth W seeksmarriesanother
personw ith w ealth W and formsa new family int+ 1.G iventhe b ehavioural
assumptionsoutlined ab ove,the issue ofthe d istributionofw ealth thenfocuses
onthe d istributionoffamiliesby size.Inthiscase memb ersofthe population
completelyarecharac terised by the pair (W;k).A (W;k)-family consistsof2 + k
persons: tw o parents,each ofw hom possessesonmarriage w ealth W ,and w ho
d ivid e their w ealth equallyamongtheir k child ren.
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3.1 M ainresult













E quilib rium cond ition(6) impliesthat for anytw o d istinc t valuesW ,W 02 I the


















Inview of(2 ), 0 · ak < 1 for non-trivialfamily struc tures.B y d e¯nitionof
a d istributionfunctionW 0¸ W () F(W 0;¼) ¸ F(W ;¼). T here are tw o
c ases: (1) F isconstant over I ; (2 ) there exist some W;W 0 2 I such that
F(W 0;¼) > F(W ;¼).Case (1) istrivialsince it meansthat there isno-one w ith
w ealth inI.Incase (2 ), b ec ause ofthe assumed continuity ofF over I , there












; 8W 2 I
)
; (12 )





= F(W;¼); 8W 2 I : (13)
It isthenevid ent that (6) implies






Inother w ord sthe equilib rium cond itionfor the w ealth intervalisequivalent to
requiringthat the younger generation'sw ealth b e a quasilinear w eighted mean7
ofK valuesofw ealth inthe old er generation,w here the quasilinear meaniscon-
struc ted usingthe (transformed ) d istributionfunction.How ever w e c anfurther
restric t the func tionG ,and hence the d istributionfunctionF.
Lemma 1 T he functionG must satisfyeither
G (x) = Alog(x)+ B ; x2 X (15)
6N oticethat,byde¯ nition,1 2 X .
7SeeA cz¶el(1 966)page240 ,D hombres(1 984).
7
or
G (x) = Axµ + B ; x2 X (16)
where A isnonzero.
P roof.See Append ix.
Lemma 1 lead simmed iately to a result that hasparticularlyinterestingeco-
nomic implic ations.
T heorem 2 Inthe case ofstric t classmarriage, the equilibrium wealth d istri-
butionmust belongto the extend ed P areto Type Ifamily, throughout the region
where the equal-d ivisioninheritance rule applies.Inother word sF must satisfy




where a and b are constantsand ®(¼)2<.
P roof.U sing(11)-(13) Lemma 1 impliesthat the equilib rium d istributionmust
take either the form



















= log(x) (2 0 )
equations(18) and (19) c aneach b e w ritteninthe form (17)for a suitable spec -
i¯ c ationof®(¼).
T he classofequilib rium d istributions(17) includ esnot onlythe c onventional
P areto curve,but also the rec tangular d istributionand the \reverse P areto"for
w hich ® < ¡1.8 T he particular memb er ofthe classthat isappropriate w ill
d epend onthe parametersand the relevant d omainI.
To see the intuitionb ehind thisresult c onsid er the follow ingargument using
the equilib rium cond ition(6).Inview ofthe populationstationarity c ond ition
























= 0 (2 2 )
8See,forexample,Champernowne(1 953);seealsoChampernowne(1 952),Fisk(1 961 ).
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T he solutionto (2 2 ) w illcharac terise the shape that the w ealth d istribution
must ad opt inequilib rium. E quation(2 2 ) c anonly hold for arb itrary W , if
anappropriate separab ility result hold s. Spec i¯ c ally there must b e func tions
g :I 7! <; h :<7! <such that
F(»W ;¼)¡F(W ;¼) = g(W )h(») (2 3)
for allW and for » = k2 ¯.Inthiscase w e see immed iatelyfrom (2 3) that either
g(W ) = 0 for allW 2 I ,or else w e have h(1) = 0.
E vid entlyone trivialsolutionof(2 3) is¯ = 12 k(the c ase » = 1) and g(W ) ar-
b itrary.Inthiscase there isonlyonesize offamilyand ,aslongasthe parameters
d etermining® are appropriatelyset,anarb itraryw ealth d istributionreprod uc es
itself.A second solutioncanb e found for the c ase w here g isa c onstant: this
yield s
F(W ;¼) = alog(W )+ b: (2 4 )



























h (»): (2 6)
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g(»W ) = g(W )g(») (2 8)
T herefore g (W ) = AW µ for some A2<+ ,µ 2<.
O ne cangenerate the entire classofequilib rium d istributionsF(W ;¼) by
allow ing¼ to range over allpossible parameter values.
3.2 Determinationof®
To illustrate the w ayanequilib rium d istributionisd etermined ,take the situation
inw hich I = [W 0 ;1 ) w here W 0 isa spec i¯ ed stric tly positive levelofw ealth.
From T heorem 2 the equilib rium d istributionofw ealth isgivenby the P aretian
d istribution
F(W ;¼) = 1¡AW ¡®(¼) (2 9)









= ¯¡® (30 )
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p1 p 2 p3 p4 p5 p6
c ase (a) 0.30 0.4 5 0.2 0 0.05 0 0
c ase (b ) 0.35 0.4 5 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.0 1
Table 1: T w o familystructures
c ase (a) c ase (b )
¯ ® G ini ® G ini
0.95 1.55 0.4 76 1.4 3 0.54 3
0.90 2 .11 0.311 1.90 0.357
0.85 2 .73 0.2 2 4 2 .4 4 0.2 57
0.80 3.4 3 0.171 3.07 0.196
0.75 4.2 8 0.132 3.86 0.14 8
Table 2 : E quilib rium valuesof® for tw o d istributionsoffamilysize
To see the implic ationsofthisfor w ealth inequality take the tw o casesofthe
family-size d istributionsinTable 1:incase (b ) there isa w id er spread offamilies
bysize incomparisonto c ase (a).
T he equilib rium d istributionofw ealth w illd epend onthe rate ofinheritance
taxand the other componentsofthe autonomousgrow th fac tor ofnet w ealth ¯
asw ellasthe struc ture offamiliesby size.T able 2 givesthe P areto coe± c ient
® and also the implied G ini c oe± c ient ofthe resultingequilib rium d istribution
(w hich equals 12 ®¡1 inthiscase) usingequation(30 ),for variousvaluesof¯ and
the tw o c asesinTable 1.Lookingd ow nany one columnofTable 2 it isclear
that ® d ec reasesand equilib rium inequality increasesas¯ increases.U singthe
interpretation(3) thisimpliesthat equilib rium inequalityd ec reasesw ith the rate
ofinherit tax.Lookingacrossanyrow Table 2 w e see that increasingthe spread
offamilysizesincreasesthe inequalityofthe w ealth d istribution.
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4 M arriage out ofClass
Inthisand sec tion5 w e reconsid er some ofthe restric tive assumptionsused in
the b asic mod el,and w e investigate to w hat extent theymay b e relaxed .
T he assumptionthat people onlymarrythose w ho have w ealth equalto their
ow nisperhapsone ofthe most restric tive featuresofthe simple framew orkthat
hasb eenused so far.How ever, the b asic mod elcanb e ad apted ina w ay that
permitsa simple mod i¯ c ationofT heorem 2 .Inthisvariant ofthe mod elfamilies
are charac terised bythree parameters(W;±;k),w hereW isnow the w ealth ofthe
poorer ofthe tw o marriage partners,and ±¸0 isa \class-d isloyalty"parameter.
A personw ith w ealthW marriessomeone w ith w ealthW [1+ ±],forW ,W [1+ ±]2
I ;so the w ealth received by a child ina (W;±;k)-familyis [2 + ±]Wk .
To make thisversionofthe mod eloperationalw e require anassumptionab out
the d istributionofmarriage partners- the d istributionof±.Anad d itionalequi-
lib rium cond itionisalso required since those w ho marryab ove their stationmust
b e matched by those w ho marry b eneath them. T hisind ucesa c onstraint on
the ad missible classofd istributionsof±.w e shallreturnto thisb elow .T he key
assumptionisasfollow s.
Axiom 4 T he d istributionof± isind epend ent ofW for allW 2 I.
T hismeansthat classd isloyalty isind epend ent ofw ealth. Let © b e the















d © (±) (31)
O nreplac ingthe w eightsak in(9) by 12 kpkd © (±) it isclear that (31) w illagain
yield a w eighted quasilinear mean,similar to (14 ).T herefore,inview ofT heorem
2 w e have:
Corollary3 G iventhe wealth-ind epend ence ofthe d istributionofthe class-d isloyalty
parameter ±, the equilibrium d istributionofwealth inthe intervalmust belongto
the extend ed P areto class, asspec i¯ ed inT heorem 2 .
To see the w ayinw hich the marriage-out-of-classmod elw orkstake a spec i¯ c
example inw hich the patternoffamiliesisthe same againasit w asinCase (a)
ofTable 1.ab ove,and inw hich the d istributionofthe d isloyalty parameter is
verysimple - onlyone value ispossible.Now ,instead ofthe tw o partnershaving
equalw ealth b efore marriage,suppose that one partner isjust tw ic e asw ealthy
asthe other (± = 1),and consid er the e®ec t that thisw ould have onthe d egree
ofinequalityofthe equilib rium w ealth d istributioninthe mod el.Although this
important mod i¯ c ationto the mod elw illnot change the resultingfunctionform
ofthe w ealth d istributionit w illchange the particular memb er ofthe classof
equilib rium w ealth d istributionsthat c orrespond sto a spec i¯ c instance ofthe
family-size d istributionp.For example, take the b equestsmad e to child renof
familiesw ith a c omb ined w ealth-levelof2 units.Inthe mod elofsec tion3,15
perc ent oftheir d escend antsleave 2 ¯, 4 5 perc ent leave ¯; 30 perc ent leave 23¯
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and 10 perc ent leave 12 ¯:B ut now ,ineach ofthese four groupsofd escend antsa
proportion¸ w illmarrypartnerstw ice asw ealthy,and so the average w ealth w ill
b e 1.5 timesthe climb er'spre-marriage w ealth: the remaining1¡¸ w illmarry
partnershalfasw ealthy,and for them the average w ealth after marriage w illb e
onlythree-quartersoftheir ow npre-maritalw ealth.
T he value ¸ ofthat isconsistent w ith the assumed marriage rule inequilib rium
w illd epend onthe d istributionofw ealth.Since c orollary3impliesthat w ealth
hasa P areto d istributionw ith parameter ® , and since there must b e [1 + ±]®
timesasmanymarriagesofspousesinthe range [1§²]w ith spousesinthe range
[1§²]
[1+ ±] asw ith spousesinthe range [1§²][1 + ±],thisisonlypossible if
¸ =
1
1 + [1 + ±]®
(32 )
G iventhe class-d isloyalty assumptionsand a spec i¯ c value ofthe d isloyalty
parameter ±,w e mayw rite the required parameter set ¼ asa triple:
¼ := (¯ ;±;p) (33)
Ifthe familysize-d istributionparametersp satisfythe stationarity c ond ition(2 )




1 + [1 + ±]®




¯ 0 0 .2 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2 .0 2 .5
0.95 1.4 3 1.4 4 1.52 1.80 2 .52 3.66 4.79
0.90 1.90 1.94 2 .10 2 .72 3.93 5.4 4 7.06
0.85 2 .4 4 2 .50 2 .78 3.87 5.80 8.32 11.82
0.80 3.07 3.17 3.66 5.57 9.2 3 16.2 7 37.2 0
0.75 3.86 4 .03 4.89 8.88 2 1.50
Table 3: E ®ec tsofgrow th fac tor ¯ and classd isloyalty ± onequilib rium P areto
c oe± cient ®
Consid er the implic ationsofthe class-d isloyaltymod elfor the equilib rium d is-
tribution.Clearlythenew assumptionsofthismod elw illchange the relationship
b etw eenthe parameter ¯ and the equilib rium inequality ofw ealth d istribution
(w hich isinversely related to the P areto coe± c ient ® ). Take for example c ase
(b ) ofthe family-size d istributionp inTable 1.B y solvingfor ®(¼) from (34 )
for alternative valuesofand ¯,and ±,w e ob tainTables3and 4 .Quite mod est
increasesinclass-d isloyaltyhave a c onsid erable impac t onequilib rium inequality.
For example anincrease in± from 1.0 to 1.5red uc esthe G inic oe± cient by30 to
4 5percent.T he table also impliesthe extent to w hichsoc ialforc esmaysubstitute
for ¯scaltools.Suppose that overallgrow th isjust su± cient to ¯nance lifetime
c onsumptionso that ¯ = 1¡¿ in(3)and c onsid er the value ofthe inheritance tax
that w ould yield a givenequilib rium value of® = 2 (a G ini coe± c ent of0.333).
Ifthe c ond itionsofstric t assortative mating(the ± = 0 c olumninTables3and
4 ) w ere to b e replac ed bya state w here everyone married some w ith tw ic e (half)
asmuch w ealth (± = 1 inTables3and 4 ) the taxrate required to support the
givenequilib rium d istributionw ould fallfrom 11.0 perc ent to 6.2 percent.
16
±
¯ 0 0 .2 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2 .0 2 .5
0.95 0.539 0.530 0.4 93 0.385 0.2 4 9 0.158 0.117
0.90 0.357 0.34 8 0.313 0.2 2 6 0.14 6 0.10 1 0.076
0.85 0.2 58 0.2 50 0.2 19 0.14 8 0.0 94 0.064 0.0 4 4
0 .80 0.19 4 0.187 0.158 0.0 99 0.057 0.032 0.0 14
0.75 0.14 9 0.14 2 0.114 0.060 0.0 2 4
T able 4 : E ®ec tsofgrow th fac tor ¯ and classd isloyalty ± onequilib rium w ealth
inequality(G inic oe± cient)
5 E xtensionsofthe M od el
5.1 Alternative Inheritance Rules
Suppose the equal-d ivisionrule for d istributingone'sb equestsw ere replaced by
some other inheritance principle.T he principle mayd i®er from one size offamily
to another but,aslongasthe rule isind epend ent ofthe leveloffamily w ealth,
the equilib rium cond ition(5) w illonce againlead to a quasilinear w eighted mean
ofthe form (14 ).T he set ofw eightsa1;:::;aK w illingenerald i®er from those in
sec tion3and w illd epend onthe prec ise d ivisionrule: for example the share of
anyone child might d epend onitsrankord er inthe family.How ever,the original
resultsw ere established for arb itrary w eights, and so againLemma 1 hold sin
anappropriatelymod i¯ ed form.T herefore w e c anextend T heorem 2 to c asesin
w hich some proportionate b equest rule other thanequald ivisionisconsistently
applied throughout the w ealth intervalI.O fcourse the equilib rium value of®
w illd epend onthe particular b equest rule that isemployed .
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5.2 R ed istributive Taxation
Asa further extensionofthe mod i¯ c ationto the inheritance rule, consid er the
impac t ofred istributive w ealth or inheritance taxation. So far w e have just
c onsid ered a proportionate rate oftaxw ith the possib ility that the proc eed sare
d istributed somew here outsid e the particular part ofthe ec onomic system that w e
are examining.Now take a more c omprehensive versionofa red istributive tax:9
w e introd uc e a linear taxuponthe joint b equest ofthe testators,a type oftax
func tionthat isw id ely used insimpli¯ ed ec onomic mod els,and isa reasonable
approximationto many actualtaxsched ules. U nd er thislinear red istributive
tax-func tionassumptionthe inheritance ofeach child ina (W;k)-family isgiven
by
¹W + 2 [1¡¿]¯ W
k
(35)
w here ¿ and W are taxparametersand ¯ isthe grow th fac tor for w ealth b efore
tax.Now ,instead ofequation(10 ) introd uc e the follow inginconjunctionw ith
equations(7) to (9):
W k =
k[W ¡ ¹W ]









[inf(I )+ sup (I )]+
¹W
2 [1¡¿]¯
T henthe quasilinear meanrelationship giveninequation(11, 13 and 14 ) -
hold sonce more, w ith mod i¯ ed w eights.So Lemma 1 isvalid inthismod i¯ ed
versionofthe mod elalso.O nsubstitutingb ackusing(36) w e ¯nd :
T heorem 4 Ifprivate bequest rulesare ind epend ent ofwealth, and allinher-
itancesare subjec t to a linear red istributive tax, thenover the relevant w ealth
range the d istributionofwealth followsa P areto type IId istribution:




where a, b and care constantsand ® (¼)2<.
5.3 M od i¯ ed SavingsB ehaviour
T he ab ove resultsyield aninsight into a further mod i¯ c ationthat may b e mad e
to the b asic mod elofsec tion2 .T husfar the assumptionhasb eenmad e that at
everyrelevant w ealth levelb equestsare proportionalto w ealth so that,ofcourse,
lifetime c onsumptionisalso proportionalto w ealth for allW 2 I ,w ith the same
proportionapplyingto allfamilies.Consid er tw o extensionsofthe mod elinthe
d irec tionofrealism.
19
First,it iseasyto see that the assumptionthat there isa single value of¯ c an
b e replaced w ith anassumptionthat ¯ isd istributed inthe population,ac c ord ing
to d i®erencesinparents' tastesfor their ow n(current) consumptionasagainst
the c onsumptionoftheir o®spring,or ac cord ingto d i®erencesintax-treatment
offamiliesac cord ingto some other personalcircumstance ofthe families,or ac -
c ord ingto d i®erencesinexogenousgrow th ratesofw ealth.O nce againw e w ould
need to assume that the d istributionof¯ isind epend ent ofW ,but that isall.
Familiesw ould thenb e charac terised bythe quad ruple (W;±;¯;k)spec ifyingtheir
pre-nuptialw ealthlevel,classd isloyaltyonmarriage,grow th-fac tor ofw ealth and
numb er ofchild ren.T he mod i¯ c ationto the b asic result w ould follow essentially
the linesofthe mod i¯ c ationfor the class-d isloyalty case d iscussed insection4.
A mod i¯ ed versionofCorollary1 w illhold .
Sec ond ,w e c angeneralise the form ofthe proportionalsavingsfunction.Sup-
pose instead that lifetime consumptiontakesthe follow ingform:
C = C 0 + c¯¤W (38)
w here C 0 ¸0 ,c> 0 ,¯¤> 0 are parameters;¯¤ c anb e takenasthe autonomous
grow th fac tor ofafter-taxw ealth d uringa person'slifetime.T henonce againthe





Comparing(39) w ith (35),the follow ingisimmed iate:
Corollary5 Iflifetime consumptionisana± ne (linear) transformationofwealth
inthe basic inheritance mod el, thenthe equilibrium d istributionofwealth isof
P areto Type II(Type I).
6 Conclud ingR emarks
P areto d istributionspop up allover the literature onthe d istributionofw ealth.
It isinterestingto know w hy thisshould b e so.
T he method offunctionalequationanalysissuggestsa simple reasonw hy
thispatternofthe w ealth d istributionshould b e so persistent.T hisapproach is
und emand inginthat it merelyrequiresthat the assumed equilib rium d istribution
b e c ontinuous,and that a particular system ofmarriage,savingand b equest rules
applyover a w ealth-intervalthat d oesnot containzero,and that isw id e enough
to ac c ommod ate the w ealth-valuesofthe o®springofsome ofthe familiesw ith
w ealth inthat interval.T he method hasthe further ad vantage that the results
go through merelyasa consequence ofthe formald e¯nitionofequilib rium,and
not w ith reference to anyparticular mod elofa proc essthrough time.
T hisisnot to say that explicit mod ellingthe proc essofw ealth ac cumulation
or the b equest d ecisionisunimportant.Far from it.B ut it isusefulto know that
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2 3
A P roofofLemma 1
From (14 ) for some positive scalar ¸ w e must have:
¸x = G ¡1
Ã KX
k= 1
ak G (¸ xk)
!
; (4 0 )
or
x = H ¡1
Ã KX
k= 1
ak H (¸ xk)
!
(4 1)









ak H (¸ xk)
!
: (4 2 )
W ithout lossofgenerality w e may take a1;a2 > 0 , and set x3;:::;xK equalto
some arb itrary constants¹x3;:::;¹xK.T henintrod uc e:
zi:= aiG (xi); i= 1;2 (4 3)
We mayconsid er z1;z2 asvaryingover some openintervalJ½[0 ;1].Also d e¯ne
func tions¥ ;ª ;© :



























ak H (¹xk) (4 6)
U singthese variablesand func tionsw e mayrew rite (4 2 ) as:
¥(z1 + z2 ) = ª (z1)+ © (z2 ); z1;z2 2 Z (4 7)
w hich isa restric ted P exid er equation(E ichhorn1978).T he stand ard solution
to thisis
ª (z) = Á(z)+ c (4 8)
w here cisanarb itrary c onstant and Á isanarb itrary solutionofthe Cauchy
equation
Á(z1 + z2 ) = Á(z1)+ Á(z2 ); z1;z2 2< (4 9)
T hisimplies
ª (z) = h z + c (50 )
w here h isa positive c onstant.So,since G and H are stric tlyincreasingfunctions,
(4 5) and (50 ) yield :
H (x) = h G (x)+ g
w here g := ca1.Inthe present c ase it isclear from (4 0 ) and (4 1) that the valuesg
and h mayd epend onthe value of¸ that had b eenchosen,so that w e mayw rite:
G (¸ x) = h (¸ )G (x)+ g(¸ );8¸ ;x;¸x2 X (51)
2 5
T here are tw o c asesto c onsid er insolving(51).First,ifh isind epend ent of¸
(let ussay h (¸ ) = 1 for all¸ ),then(51) implies
¹G (¸ x) = ¹G (x)+ ¹G (¸ ); (52 )
w here
¹G (x) := G (x)¡G (1): (53)
Inview ofthe assumed c ontinuityofG over the intervalX ,equation(52 ) implies:
¹G (x) = Alog(x); A6= 0 ; (54 )
Alternatively,ifh isnot ind epend ent of¸ w e must have:10
h (¸ x) = h (¸ )h(x);8¸ ;x;¸x 2 X (55)
1 0CfA cz¶el(1 987)page26.
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w hich impliesh(x) > 0 for allx 2 X .11 Take the follow inglogarithmic transfor-
mationsofthe variab lesand ofthe functionh
Á(y) := h(log(x));
y:= log(x) z = log(¸ );
8y;z;2 Z ;8¸ ;x;¸x 2 X
9>>>>=>>>>; (56)
w e then¯nd that (55) b ec omes
Á(y+ z) = Á(y)+ Á(z); 8y;z;y+ z 2 Z (57)
w hich isthe stand ard Cauchy equationona hexagon. Since 1 2 X , w e have
0 2 Z ,and und er these cond itions(57) hasa unique extensionfrom Z to <.12
T he solutionto (57) isthen:13
Á(y) = µy; µ 2<nf0g; 8y2 Z (58)
w hich implies
h(x) = xµ x 2 X : (59)
Takingthe tw o casestogether either (15) or (16) must b e satis¯ ed .
1 1 T hereasonforthis is that1 2 X ,sothatifx2 X ,then(55)impliespx2 X and,using
(55)again,h(x)=h(
p
x)2 ¸0 .H owever,h(x)cannotbezeroforanyx2X withoutviolating
thestrictmonotonicityofhoverX .
1 2See,forexample,A cz¶elandD hombres(1 989)Chapter7,T heorem 5.
1 3SeeA cz¶el(1 987),page20.
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